takes the strong position that many of the current disparities in health care by race are attributable to forms of conscious and unconscious discrimination by health care providers.The study, however, is flawed by imprecise definitions of discrimination that fail to distinguish between differences in treatment due to breakdown in communications and differences in the treated population that are prompted by invidious motives of health care providers. It is doubtful that hidden forms of discrimination are prevalent in a profession whose professional norms are set so strongly against it. In addition, the IOM relies too uncritically on similar studies in unrelated fields to show the ostensible forms of discrimination. These errors have adverse social consequences. A false diagnosis of discrimination where none exists will send a false signal to members of racial minorities that may induce them to avoid receiving needed medical care and instead pursue costly and ineffective remedial devices that will take away funds better spent on providing direct health care.
the disparities that it does observe. At the outset, "The study committee defines disparities in health care as racial or ethnic differences in the quality of health care that are not due to access-related factors or clinical needs, preferences, or appropriateness of intervention" (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003, 3-4) . The IOM study gives the term preferences a narrow construction so as to exclude any preferences that are influenced by knowledge that members of minority groups, especially African Americans, have of past institutionalized injustices in the United States. These injustices include both the general history of segregation and specific instances of medical malfeasance, of which the notorious Tuskegee experiment counts as the leading illustration (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003, 4, 131-32) . The IOM report notes that some fraction of the disparity could be attributable to "Discrimination that results from biases, prejudices, stereotyping, and uncertainty in clinical communication and decision-making" (4). It then promptly injects a note of caution by observing that its definitions are used for the purposes of the report only, and do not count as "legal definitions" (4), while stopping short of indicating what those legal definitions might require, and how they might differ from other definitions that could be offered. Elsewhere, the IOM report defines discrimination as "the differential and negative treatment of individuals on the basis of their race, ethnicity, gender, or other group membership" (95), without exploring how those differences arise or why they might in some cases be justified.The conclusions in the report are summarized in its basic recommendations.These include an increased awareness of the scope and sources of discrimination in health care by health care providers and the general public (6); increased representation of minority health care providers among health care professionals; improved language communication, especially for individuals whose first language is not English; and increased resources for funding the enforcement of the civil rights law in this area.
The IOM report exhaustively reviews large numbers of individual surveys that find differential access to certain medical procedures that are correlated with race or ethnic status, even after various confounding variables (age, income, location, education, etc.) are taken into account. It recognizes that some portion of this difference could be explained by differential patient responses to proposed treatments, but nonetheless concludes that this phenomenon is not likely to amount to a large effect in most settings. It does not refer to any of the work that points out the difficulties in dealing with the measurement of discrimination or the scholarship that argues that market forces go a long way to ameliorate its effects (Becker 1971; Epstein 1992; Heckman 1998) .
So the question arises, just what explanations offer the best account of any observed disparity? The answer, which seems ominous, is that much of that persistent difference is likely to be explained by residual forms of invidious discrimination that operate, as it were, on the subconscious level.The IOM study infers the persistence of discrimination in health care by noting the legion of other studies that have found unconscious discrimination, if not pervasive prejudice S28 (Ayres 2001) , to persist in other areas of life, such as employment, mortgage lending, and housing, which is said to be documented by the use of testers who are able to elicit differential responses, or which may be detected by closely examining market data involving consummated transactions.
The thesis of this short article is that the leap from disparity to discrimination is not, on balance, established. It is of course the case that some individual health care provider could have some bias against members of different racial or ethnic groups. But, if so, there is no reason to expect any particular direction to any such individual biases, and no evidence of any institutional forms of bias that require some systematic institutional response. Rather, the path to inference is rendered more uncertain by a variety of definitional, methodological, and empirical issues that beset any systematic effort to identify the levels of discrimination in the provision of health care, or for that matter other types of services today. In particular, the IOM study devotes insufficient effort to fashioning a consistent and coherent definition of discrimination. In addition, it tends to downplay the serious difficulties that arise from seeking to prove some form of discrimination either by the use of testers or the evaluation of field data, both beyond and within the health care area.
Definitional Questions of Discrimination
There are a number of important issues that could be included under the discrimination heading. The point here is not simply one of the choice of stipulative definitions.The word discrimination carries strong negative connotations, and any individual or group that is found to have practiced overt and conscious discrimination is, without question, subject to serious legal, social, and business sanctions. These sanctions would remain even if the antidiscrimination laws were repealed tomorrow. But no matter what the legal framework, the social importance that is attached to the antidiscrimination norm makes it absolutely vital that this term, and the opprobrium it carries, are not falsely attached to any individual or institution.The concern goes not only to the inherent injustice of making false charges against the innocent, but also to the waste of social resources, economic and moral, that are spent in denouncing or correcting some nonexistent wrong. Misinformation always leads to bad decisions by individuals and groups, and false claims of discrimination are no exception to that general rule.That particular risk is increased in light of the various factors that the IOM lumps together under the heading of discrimination: clinical uncertainty, poor communications, medical decisions under time pressure with limited information, the implicit nature of stereotypes, health care provider prejudice or bias (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003, 9-11, 160-74) . The last two items on this list are the source of a genuine social concern and merit strong condemnation. But that same condemnation does not by any stretch of the imagination apply to the various communications and technical problems that arise in the course of the physician-patient relationship. It should not be surprising that slips occur in the effort to transmit information in difficult settings. Matters of clinical judgment often depend on good communication, so any disparity in treatment that is attributable to this factor also counts as an issue of concern, but not as a form of discrimination.
At this point, the key elements of discrimination are bias or prejudice. Both of these are difficult to defend since, by definition, they preclude the possibility of any justification or excuse.The case for the IOM study would be far stronger if it could offer documented instances of systematic overt bias and prejudice. These are rarities, in sharp contrast to the overt promotion of affirmative action, which is never treated as a form of discrimination, but as its antidote.The point here is not to attack affirmative action programs, especially if voluntary, but to point out that these count as forms of discrimination that are easy to detect, even if they are fully justified. But invidious forms of discrimination are hard to find because they occur only infrequently, given the costs that attach to them. All sorts of horrific practices that were painfully evident 50 years ago have almost entirely disappeared today.
The most elusive term in the analysis, therefore, is the bridge notion of stereotyping. In one sense, stereotype is simply one term to describe prejudice or bias that operates at the group or the individual level and that, once proved, allows for no defense. But here the definitional issues matter: do true generalizations count as stereotypes, even if they convey a negative impression about the group to which they apply? If someone says that members of group X are likely to have a higher crime rate than members of group Y, that statement is true even if individual x in group X has never committed a crime while individual y in group Y has committed a crime. It is of course wholly improper to use any statement about groups when it is certain that the generalized description in question does or does not apply to a given individual. More generally, the claim about bias and prejudice is that these forms of behavior are at their strongest when decision makers rely on false generalizations as a basis for future behavior, a wrong that is compounded when they do so with knowledge of the error. But it is much more difficult to attach equal, or even any, condemnation to the correct use of statistical generalizations in the absence of such certain information, especially when it is widely known that background probabilities count for a great deal in making any accurate estimation of risk, and that some sensible heuristics might work well to combine background with case information (Gigerenzer,Todd, and ABC Research Group 1999; Kahneman 1973, 1974) .
There is a great willingness to combine background information (about the frequency of blue and yellow buses on a particular route) with specific information (what someone recalls to be the color of this bus) in dealing with ordinary questions of evidence. It therefore requires at least some pause before that strategy of compound identification is condemned when the background information contains a race variable. When Jesse Jackson states that he is more worried when tailed by a black man than a white man near his home, he is making ra-
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tional statements about risk, and about the benefits of taking evasive action. 2 The same is true of a cab driver of whatever race who is uneasy about taking a wholly respectable passenger into a dangerous black neighborhood.The risks of adverse consequences are not wholly dependent on who that passenger is or how he behaves. It also depends in part on the conduct of potential criminals who cannot be observed at the outset of the transaction, or even the inability to get a return fare to offset some portion of the cost.
The original models of discrimination were all targeted at irrational forms of behavior, and never once addressed what should be done for rational forms of discrimination.That omission counts as the soft underbelly of the entire antidiscrimination edifice. Irrational forms of discrimination will be dissipated, because new entrants or other established firms will actively seek the market that bigots prefer to leave to one side. In contrast, markets will never dissipate rational forms of discrimination, because all other individuals and firms will face the same costs as the incumbent.The only way in which to change behavior is to coerce all entrants to take on high-cost customers by threatening them with a fine or other sanctions equal or greater than the expected losses of taking high-risk or highcost customers. Hence the constant campaign to strip cab drivers of their licenses (with the side effect that the added costs may reduce entry into the field). It may be regrettable that Jesse Jackson or the ordinary cab driver have reason to respond as they do to danger, but it hardly counts as blind prejudice for this negative treatment if it responds to economic costs that are real. No one would question the use of that information to choose between different individuals if everyone were of the same race; why then, if the information is reliable, does it become morally necessary (without the benefit of any sustained argument) to rule these behaviors out of bounds? The IOM study is flawed at its root because of its studious avoidance of the definitional questions. Its implicit definition of discrimination cuts too broadly, because it forecloses any debate over possible justifications for any observed negative treatment.The effortless appeal of prejudice and stereotyping skews the fundamental inquiry.
In order to see the full complexity of this definitional issue, it is useful to note that the original purpose of the civil rights laws was to remove what their supporters counted as the irrational use of race in making decisions. The basic expectation was that the elimination of discrimination would result in more efficient markets because of the removal of extraneous factors.Typical of the general observations is this statement by Congressman Joseph Minish (1964) : "Under Title VII, employment will be on the basis of merit, not race."The last objective that anyone defended early on was that the introduction of an antidiscrimination law would introduce any element of subsidy in favor of members of any group. Yet just that can happen by using definitions that knock out statistical information because of its disparate impact on grounds of race. The point here-that discrimination laws can create implicit cross-subsidies-is of major significance, for all forms of insurance necessarily rely on group characteristics as signals for the occurrence of some future, uncertain, and insurable event. It is of course possible by law to ban the use of explicit racial classifications in dealing with insurance, but I know of no major corporation that would ever risk the incorporation of an explicit race variable into its rate structure, no matter what the legal rules provided: the public ill will would be too difficult to withstand. But risk classifications have to depend on some variables, and it is hard to justify any conclusion that an insurer has behaved out of bias and prejudice when it allows rates to vary on these other factors.The willingness to condemn accurate statistical behavior as a form of stereotyping impinges on the ability to use reliable race-neutral proxies (e.g., home address or college boards) that are in fact correlated with race because of their disparate impact. More concretely, the sketchy IOM study treatment of discrimination perpetuates a major ambiguity of the equation, because there are in fact two quite distinct treatments of discrimination-one economic and the other legal-that have been at work in this area. The legal definition ignores the differences in the cost of providing services to different groups of individuals.
For example, in the insurance market, if the only covered individuals were members of group A with a premium that averages $100 per person, then that average rate should not go up or down because of the introduction into the mix of group B with an average premium of $150 (or $50) per person. The median rates in both settings should remain the same, as should the variation across members in the group, as determined by any nonracial variables that might have predictive value.The basic rate structure allows the firm to obtain a normal rate of return from its investment from the customers in group A, and gives all individual members the same expected return on their premium. (Here I ignore the complications that arise if there are any economies of scale that allow for a reduction in the amount of fixed costs that would be allocable to any individual customer.) Stated generally, the rates charged to white and black persons should not vary with the arrival or disappearance of the other group. Given these stabilizing tendencies, any legal requirement to charge a blended rate of $125 (or $75) creates an implicit subsidy for members of one group or the other. Those individuals who are subsidized will engage in too much dangerous activity. Those who pay the subsidy will engage in too little. Either way there is a resource distortion that more accurate pricing could avoid. It follows that when the cost of service is different, charging identical rates is an economic form of price discrimination that leads to resource misallocation: too many high-risk people are in the market, and some low-risk people are driven out.
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The common legal definition of discrimination unfortunately works at crosspurposes with this economic account. Here the argument is one that stresses formal equality between members of two different groups, regardless of the incidence and distribution of actual losses. Some years ago I worked on a case in which the charge of discrimination was that the insurance rates in predominantly black neighborhoods were discriminatorily high because the identical coverage (expressed in terms of property value, limits, deductibles, period of coverage, etc.) was higher than it was in a nearby white neighborhood.The factual basis of this charge is easy to make out, because one need only compare the rates in the two areas. But the economic definition of discrimination requires that one examine the relationship between loss experience and rates, which is also easy to do at the end of the policy periods. In the cases at hand, the premiums charged in the predominantly black neighborhood were not sufficient to cover the losses in question, while those charged in the predominantly white neighborhood were more than sufficient to cover the losses in question. Stated otherwise, the insurance market was not stable in the predominantly black areas owing to the net losses, which in turn suggested exit from the area, which would be accompanied by an inflow of capital into the white neighborhoods. The contrast could not be starker.This one set of facts provides conclusive proof of two antithetical forms of discrimination: the economic account finds discrimination in favor of residents in the predominantly black neighborhood, and the legal account finds against it. When it is said that markets will not stop discrimination (Sunstein 1991) , the charge is manifestly true if the so-called legal definition of discrimination is used, but in all likelihood false if the economic definition is used.The persistence of real cost differences between groups will keep unregulated firms from charging identical rates, no matter whether the market is competitive or monopolist in structure. In the insurance case mentioned, the reason why the market did not equilibrate in accordance with the underlying losses was doubtless because of the fear of severe legal response through regulation or litigation if the economic differences were not muted. There is no question that various types of measures (e.g., assigned risk pools) can introduce a major extent of cross-subsidy in insurance markets if allowed to operate. But they can also lead to major bankruptcies if allowed to run on indefinitely (Epstein 1991) .
Some Empirical Evidence
This choice between competing definitions helps explains much of the data found when dealing with these issues in multiple contexts. The IOM report seeks to bolster its own case for discrimination in access to medical care by looking at studies of discrimination in employment, lending, and other areas (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003, 96-101) .
Employment markets are one such area, and there have been studies that have claimed extensive prejudice in their operation. One study by Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse (2000) , relying on data from the late 1960s and early 1970s, reported that women in highly competitive auditions for orchestral positions improved their success rate relative to men once the standard viewed auditions were replaced by blind auditions, which required all applicants to perform from behind a curtain. I have no reason to quarrel with the data, but I question the implications.The change in procedure was adopted by the orchestra itself, which offers evidence that markets are capable of self-correction once some unfairness is pointed out. Similar procedures are now standard in most auditions. Second, the blind audition process (in unionized orchestras) covers initial stages, and not the final round before the conductor and the final selection committee. And for good reason: something is lost about the dynamics of an orchestra, which depends in part on interactions and appearance. Third, the study does give a full account of the entire range of hiring practices. Blind auditions are consistent with affirmative action programs that recruit women candidates for auditions in the first place. Do those who believe that there is pervasive discrimination against women deny the power of affirmative action programs in virtually all aspects of higher education? Or assume that the scores in science and math for women at select institutions are indistinguishable from those of men? To admit the truth of these statements is not to condemn the practices in question, for any conscious discrimination in favor of women could well be justified on the ground that no test of individual merit captures the interactive and team elements so important in any work place. Contrary to what the defenders of the civil rights laws thought, "merit" is not exclusively an individual concept, but one that rests in large measure on the "fit" that individual workers have with the team of which they are a part (Collins 2001) . But no matter how one comes out on this, any overall assessment of this issue cannot treat the affirmative action question as though it were wholly separate from the discrimination issue, when in fact they are opposite sides of the same coin.
Further evidence of "pervasive prejudice" has been advanced chiefly by Ian Ayres (2001) . Some years ago, Ayres published a number of highly visible studies that purported to document through the use of testers persistent discrimination in the level of markup that dealers charged customers for new automobiles.Ayres concluded that there is, to use his phrase,"pervasive prejudice" in a wide range of important markets, such as automobiles and housing, that allow for any variation in price.The source and depth of this prejudice is somewhat obscure and may or may not rest on associational dislikes-for instance, people who don't like to be around black persons.Ayres observes that "if sellers enjoy extracting an extra dollar of profit from people of color more than from whites, we might expect to see disparate racial treatment in pricing or quality of service" (Ayres 2001, 4) . One could question which "sellers" fit this odd description, or why ask there are no sellers who find similar pleasure in milking their white customers. Even so, this form of prejudice is treated as extraordinarily tenacious. In contrast to the standard economic accounts of discrimination, these differences persist strongly over S34 time in highly competitive markets and are not eroded by new entry or customer strategies of shifting from less to more desirable dealerships. In Ayres's view, these differentials represent a general pattern of unconscious stereotyping similar to that which the IOM study found in connection with the provision of health care.
Ayres's conclusions are at war with the standard economic account of discrimination.This account does not assume that all individuals are interested only in money; rather, it assumes that if the real costs are identical, as Ayres postulates them to be, then some sellers will be prepared to undercut the market, because all dealers do not suffer from the uniform degrees of latent or sadistic prejudice. The behavior of the market is not defined by how the majority of dealers respond to racial differences in their customers. It responds to how those individual dealers who are most sympathetic to black customers view the situation. If Ayres's assumptions and data are both correct, then the traditional theory has suffered a decisive refutation, with no replacement in sight.
Yet once again, his work pays no attention to the cost side of dealer-customer relations. If these relationships are more costly to continue with black customers than with white customers (because delivery is more costly, or service calls are more frequent, or if higher default rates require dealer time), then we should expect to see some price differential to persist because new entry never eliminates cost-based forms of discrimination. The audit studies used to prove discrimination, moreover, are never done in a double-blind fashion.The testers know that the experimenter hopes to find discrimination and can alter his behavior subtly to achieve those results (Heckman 1998, 107-11) . The entire theory of unconscious prejudice, moreover, is thrown into disarray because the same race differentials are observed among different customer groups, even when all the sales personnel are black (Ayres 2001, 107, n. 33) . At this point we should expect group favoritism to run in the opposite direction, to the extent that any raceneutral theory of prejudice stresses the in-group, out-group distinction.Yet none occurs, which offers at least some evidence that profit motivations do matter. Finally, the entire case for discrimination is stretched to the vanishing point when it is alleged that the financing arrangements for new automobiles are fraught with prejudice in settings where the financing company (which buys, or "accepts" commercial paper from the dealer who originates the credit sale does not even know the race of the applicants whose credit they are scoring. (Professor Ayres and I were witnesses on the opposite side of the class action brought against Nissan Corporation.) What possible role could be played by "unconscious prejudice" if two identical applicants (and remember here there is no background knowledge to control for) receive the identical mark-ups regardless of race? The only reason why any discrimination claim is plausible is that purchasing and borrowing patterns appear to differ systematically by race, so that African American customers tend to have lower credit ratings and also tend to seek higher loans, which results in higher interest rates and higher costs in placing the loans in question. Yet as Robert Bornholz and James Heckman (2005) point out in connection with their critique of Ayres's account of discrimination in organ transplantation, the object of statistical analysis is not to prove what we already know-namely, that there are differences in behaviors between white and black individuals in various institutional settings . Rather, it is to find the discrimination in treatment once those differences are controlled for, which has not happened in these automobile selling or financing markets.
Application in Medical Areas
I have spent this time examining discrimination in other areas to show that one has to take with a grain of salt the IOM claims that pervasive prejudice should be treated as an established norm in other industries. But it is clear that these techniques to prove discrimination, however shaky, can be used in the medical context as well. Ayres and his colleagues have taken the lead in arguing that the traditional guidelines for organ transplantation, with their emphasis on antigen matches, have had a disparate impact in practice even though they were neutral in form.The observation that black candidates for kidney transplants, for example, had longer queuing times than white candidates fueled some changes in the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) protocols for organ allocation.
In one sense this program is unexceptionable. If anything less than a perfect antigen match has no predictive value on how long individuals will survive upon receipt of a kidney, then that factor should be disregarded, because the only intelligible objective of our current cumbersome administrative system is to maximize the present discounted value of future years of life saved, adjusted for quality of life considerations. At this point, the only relevant comparison between two different protocols asks which one produces the larger net value from the distributed organs. In one sense, this inquiry can be run without regard to race by identifying those neutral variables (including time on a waiting list) that determine the organ allocation. From this perspective, the distribution of organs between white and black recipients is utterly immaterial, on the grounds that each counts for one and only one.
The hard question is whether the newer system or the older system of allocation better achieves this particular goal. Race is not irrelevant to the overall inquiry, because the ultimate question is not how long people will survive with a transplant, but how much longer they would survive with a transplant than on dialysis.Thus if two persons each could live five years with a transplant, and one could live only one year without it, then, all other things being equal, give the kidney to the former, at least in the absence of any market test.Therefore, if race is a determinant of receptivity to dialysis, it should be taken into account in service of the neutral end. At most, race (or randomization) would be a decider only when there is no difference on the strength of any medical criterion. Whether the new UNOS rules meet this test is for others to determine. Bornholz and Heckman (2005) refer to evidence that it does not.
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The question of discrimination also surfaces in connection with standardized provision of health care. In this context, the usual market forces are often consciously overridden, because the extensive set of health care services provided through government agencies require cross-subsidies among patients, which for most relevant classes of medical treatment run from white to black participants, given that the incidence of illnesses within the black population is higher than that found within the white population (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003, 81-87) . There are significant differences in the frequency of diseases of the heart, cerebrovascular diseases, malignant neoplasms, and diabetes across these groups. The bottom line is that "The mortality rate for African Americans is approximately 1.6 times higher than that for whites-a ratio that is identical to the black/ white mortality ratio in 1950" (82), which of course implies a greater absolute percentage reduction in black mortality relative to white during that period. It is, however, some evidence of the predisposition of the IOM drafters that the neutral racial policies that produce this result are not so much as mentioned, even though the adverse effects that neutral policies have on members of various minority groups, as in organ transplantation, is a staple of the modern literature.
In addition, the statistical evidence about particular treatments is in tension with the recent comprehensive study of the receipt of care by Medicare recipients, which in the words of its authors "is the first population-based study to identify a set of circumstances in which overall investments in health care are not substantially different by race, area, income and gender" (Shugarman et al. 2004, 132) . But that conclusion is based on a comprehensive study of the level of Medicare expenditures made in the last three years of life. One puzzling feature of the study is that it reports a variation in expenditure levels by race over that three-year period: expenditures for blacks are lower than those for whites in the second and third year before death; however, in the last year of life, expenditures by race overall are not statistically different" (131). But for individuals over 90, in the third year before death, expenditures are "moderately higher" for blacks and for whites (131). An adequate theory will require one to explain these differences by year and by age cohort. But whatever that explanation might be, it does not seem consistent with any simple explanation of unconscious discrimination. Indeed, the overall size of this study (241,000 records) from a major federal program might have more weight than specific studies based on small populations associated with a particular disease or a treatment. If there is no obvious form of discrimination in one of the central health care programs of our time, why then presume that it exists in other contexts.
The question, then, is what to make of the persistent, but by no means uniform, findings of differential treatment that are reported in these areas.The first task is to understand the detailed industry judgments before drawing any inferences about the levels of discrimination. In medical services, cost is often not the relevant variable for patient choice or physician treatment, so that the determinants of medical choices are harder to find. As noted, the IOM report (which was written before the Shugarman study was published) lumps together the questions of clinical uncertainty and communication breakdown with bias and prejudice in dealing with discrimination. Yet there is good reason why this should not be so. The failures that occur in these instances are not the result of ill motive or insensitive behavior. The breakdowns in the system, and these are numerous, are problems of management that everyone should try to eliminate, but they are not the outgrowth of some deep-seated structural failure.
The question then arises of just how pervasive these failures could be. Given the observed differences in the treated populations, the structural failures could be every bit as pervasive as the alleged discrimination in health care. Here are some possibilities that could be taken into account, but often are not.The conscientious physician does not treat any medical condition in isolation. It is critical to know something of the capabilities of the patient and the surrounding support structure from family and friends. For example, assume that we have a situation in which the choice is between a simple procedure with modest returns and a complex procedure with higher returns but greater risk.The same physician might be well advised to recommend the former procedure to patients with less sophistication and weak support services, and the latter procedure to individuals with high awareness and strong support procedures. As with general efforts to prove discrimination, the number of variables that can be included in any regression are far fewer than those that can be taken into account in dealing with the case, whether we deal with automobile sales representatives or physicians (Heckman 1998) . In the treatment of any particular case, that judgment will be based on the treating physician's close personal assessment of the individuals in question and will not turn on the only variables that outside analysts can use: age, income, years of education, etc. At this point, it could well be that recommending differential treatments represents the correct clinical judgments. If, as often happens, the coherence of family and support structures do vary by race, then, rightly understood, differences of this sort, if systematically replicated, are evidence of fair treatment across the board. Once again, if these differences do exist, then no amount of sensitivity training would-or should-eliminate them. And any litigation effort to insure uniform treatment would have the perverse effect of making medical care more dangerous to all patients.
The next question is how one can get the relevant information on the variables that count in individual cases. Large utilization studies are not likely to produce the right sort of results, because if these variables of self-sufficiency and social support networks are operative in some cases, they could easily be operative in all, which means that supposed evidence of pervasive discrimination is in reality evidence of conscientious efforts to tailor the treatment to the patient, not the statistical category. How then can we tell whether the difference is to be treated as good or bad? On this score, the Shugarman study is suggestive, because it takes a different cut into the problem. One possibility is that treatment of all individuals close to death involves a greater percentage of hospital care than is S38 found in other settings. If so, then perhaps differences in social support and education count for less because the formal institution is able to take over some of the functions that normally fall on individuals and their family.All this is at most a suggestion for which it might be possible to find some form of empirical data. But on these matters I would proceed cautiously with all statistical evidence. One needs only to look at the merciless dissection of the Ayres (2005) study on the use of omitted variables in the organ transplant cases by Bornholz and Heckman (2005) to see how profoundly professional statisticians differ among themselves on so many of these questions.
In light of the confusion on the statistical side, it seems appropriate to have recourse to another theme from the general discrimination literature. It seems very odd that latent prejudices will simmer just below the surface and never manifest themselves in visible forms of antisocial behavior. The case for pervasive discrimination seems still weaker, since virtually every writer on discrimination in health care thumpingly deplores the discrimination that they detect in their studies, and endorses an corresponding social norms (Satel and Klick 2005) .
There are, in addition, instructive anecdotes about individual physicians who sense a breakdown in communication and then take proactive steps to correct them. Satel and Klick's (2005) brief account of how poor patients, often people of color, do not know the difference between a simple swab for bacterial infection from a Pap smear for cancer is but one illustration of the communication barriers that have to be overcome in the provision of routine clinical care. M. Gregg Bloche's (2005) study of communication is yet another effort to break down the process in order to isolate the potential sources of failure.
It seems clear that most of the tangible gains that could be achieved in health care under the current system lie in making everyone more sensitive to these communications glitches. But if that is the case, then we should be deeply troubled by the IOM study's eagerness to find (illicit) discrimination as the source of the various difficulties in dealing with today's health care problems. Indeed, the constant criticisms of the current system for its untoward biases have bad shortterm consequences, when measured in flesh-and-blood terms. One public source of concern is the unwillingness of minority individuals to use the health care system because they think that it is stacked against them. If that charge were indeed true, then the decision by members of disadvantaged groups to keep out is rational: people will make less use of a system that promises them fewer benefits. But note how things look if it turns out that the claims of illicit discrimination are overplayed. At this point, the net effect is to give false information to potential users of the system, which is likely to keep them out of a health care system that is far more sympathetic to their claims than the received wisdom allows. That reluctance to work within the system in turn translates itself into lower levels of care and high risks of mortality and morbidity. I would not want that sequence of events to rest on my shoulders.
The IOM study adopts exactly the wrong approach when it lends its sympa-thetic ear to the critics of the current system. I would have written the exact opposite report. Instead of dwelling on the Tuskegee experiments as evidence of current biases that linger within the system, I would trumpet the dedicated men and women in the profession who are determined to help people of all backgrounds and races deal with their health problems. I would stress that the attitudes of physicians today have shown a true revolution from those that permeated the generation or two ago, and that the influx of physicians from all races and all walks of life has transformed the internal culture, so that wary customers should have confidence in the incredible dedication that young physicians, in particular, show, notwithstanding their long hours and low pay. Truth is, this seems like the more accurate summary of the available evidence. It is a shame to attack so many people of good will on evidence that admits a much more benign interpretation. It would be a tragedy to lose lives because of a determined effort to make things appear worse than they really are. Our health care system faces sufficient difficulties without the genteel guilt trip that pervades the IOM study, whose title Unequal Treatment contains an unjust indictment of the current health care system.
